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ABSTRACT 
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and the Joint-Bargaining Paradox 
by Suchan Chae and Paul Heidhues 
We propose a solution for bargaining problems where coalitions are bargainers. The 
solution generalizes the Nash solution and allows one to interpret a coalition as an 
institutional player whose preferences are obtained by aggregating the preferences of the 
individual members. One implication of our solution is that forming a coalition is 
unprofitable in pure-bargaining situations (the joint-bargaining paradox). We show, 
however, that forming a coalition can be profitable in a non-pure bargaining situation. 
 
Keywords: Nash bargaining solution, coalition, joint-bargaining paradox 
JEL Classification: C78 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Nash Verhandlungslösung mit Koalitionen und Harsanyi's 
Verhandlungsparadox 
In der vorliegenden Arbeit schlagen wir ein Lösungskonzept für Verhandlungsspiele 
vor, bei denen die verhandelnden Parteien aus Koalitionen von Individuen bestehen 
können. Unser Lösungskonzept basiert auf einer Verallgemeinerung der Nash-
Verhandlungslösung. Nach unserem Lösungskonzept kann eine Koalition als ein 
institutioneller Spieler aufgefasst werden, dessen Präferenzordnung auf einer 
Aggregierung der Präferenzen seiner Mitglieder basiert. Eine Implikation unserer 
Verhandlungslösung ist, dass Koalitionen in reinen Verhandlungsspielen nicht im 
Interesse der Individuen sind. In nicht reinen Verhandlungsspielen hingegen können 
Koalitionen durchaus vorteilhaft seien. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
 
In many economic, social, and political situations, bargaining takes place between organiza-
tions, such as firms, unions, research joint ventures, NGOs, political parties, and local govern-
ments, rather than between individuals. In modeling these situations, it is natural to view such
organizations as coalitions of individuals. In this paper, we propose an axiomatic bargaining solu-
tion to bargaining problems with exogenously given coalitions.
In dealing with situations where a coalition is a bargaining party, the literature on bargaining
often uses two methods. In one, payoffs are assumed to be linear in a physical good or monetary
unit so that the payoff of the coalition is the sum of the payoffs of its members. (See, for example,
Horn and Wolinsky (1988) and Jun (1989)
 
.) 
 
In the other, bargaining is delegated to one particular
member of the coalition so that the representing member’s preferences become the coalition’s
preferences. (See, for example, Perry and Samuelson (1994), Haller and Holden (1997), Segend-
orff (1998), and Cai (2000).)
For a coalition to be a bargainer, it has to be equipped with preferences relevant for bargain-
ing. If the coalition’s members have heterogeneous preferences, then a question arises as to how
one should aggregate the preferences of the individual members to obtain the preferences of the
coalition. In this regard, the delegation approach in the literature is unsatisfactory, for it biases
bargaining in favor of a chosen representative. Consider, for example, a coalition consisting of
two members that negotiates with an outsider. Suppose one of the coalition’s members has strong
bargaining characteristics (for example, he is not very risk averse) and the other has weak bargain-
ing characteristics (he is very risk averse). The coalition would prefer to delegate bargaining to the
strong member, while the coalition’s opponent would prefer to bargain with the weak player.
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Here, the choice of the representing member is bound to be 
 
ad hoc
 
. This is the case even if there is
some internal sharing mechanism among the members of a coalition. 
In this paper, we model a coalition as an institutional player whose preferences are obtained
by aggregating the preferences of its members. This is done by extending the Nash solution to a
bargaining model where the players are partitioned into coalitions. We add a new axiom to Nash’s
(1950, 1953) four axioms to treat a coalition as one bargainer. The new axiom, which will be
called representation of homogeneous coalition (RHC), states that a homogeneous coalition may
be replaced by a representative agent without changing the solution. Hence, if all members of the
coalition have identical preferences, our approach yields the same outcome as the delegation
approach. If, in addition, individual players are equipped with transferable utilities, then the pay-
off of a coalition is simply the sum of the payoffs of its members. In fact, most papers in which a
coalition bargains use the RHC property implicitly for a homogeneous coalition. What is interest-
ing is that combining this axiom with other standard axioms yields a solution that aggregates the
preferences of a (possibly heterogeneous) coalition.
In  Section 2, we show that there exists a unique solution to a pure-bargaining problem satis-
fying five axioms: Pareto efficiency, invariance with respect to affine transformation, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, anonymity, and representation of homogeneous coalition. It turns
out that our solution maximizes the weighted product of net utilities, where the weight for each
player is the reciprocal of the size of the coalition to which he belongs. 
In  Section 3.1, we compare our solution to asymmetric Nash solution à la Kalai (1977). He
remarks that an asymmetric Nash solution to a bargaining problem is equivalent to a (symmetric)
Nash solution to a replicated bargaining problem. This observation provides some intuition for
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our solution, for replication is the inverse of the reduction process we will use in order to reduce a
homogeneous coalition to a single representative player in defining the RHC property. 
In  Section 3.2, we look at “the joint-bargaining paradox” of Harsanyi (1977) using our solu-
tion. The paradox is that it may be unprofitable to form a larger coalition by combining smaller
coalitions. Even though this might seem paradoxical at first blush, it is quite natural in pure bar-
gaining situations where all bargainers have to agree to reach a desirable solution, that is, in situa-
tions were the resources of players are perfect complements to each other. Intuitively, a coalition
loses some bargaining power that individual members had because the coalition speaks with one
voice in the inter-coalition bargaining. Why do coalitions form then? To provide an answer to this
question, we show that in a non-pure bargaining situation forming a coalition can be profitable.
In  Section 4, some concluding remarks are provided. 
 
2. NASH SOLUTION WITH COALITIONS
 
Let  denote the set of players. Then a coalition structure on 
 
N
 
 is a partition of
 
N
 
, denoted
 
 
 
. Let  and  denote an 
 
n
 
-dimensional Euclidean space
indexed by  and its nonnegative orthant, respectively. Let  be the feasible set and
 the breakdown point. Then  is a bargaining problem. This generalizes the
usual bargaining problem , where the coalition structure can be taken to be the finest
N 1 … n, ,{ }=
C N( ) C1 … Cm, ,{ }= RN R+N
N S RNÌ
b RN˛ C N( ) S b, ,( )
N S b, ,( )
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partition . We will use , , and  to denote “  for all
”, “  and  for some ”, and “  for all ”, respectively.
Normalize the feasible set  by the breakdown point  and denote it by
 
1
 
 
,
and put 
.
We require that any bargaining problem satisfy the following three assumptions:
 
A1.
 
 Either  or there exists some  such that .
 
2
 
 
 
A2.
 
  is compact.
 
A3.
 
 In the case where ,  is strictly convex.
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A solution is a function 
 
F
 
 that associates to each bargaining problem  a payoff
vector . Consider the following four properties of a solution: 
 
Pareto Efficiency
 
 
 
(PE):
 
 
 
There exist no  with .
 
1. Harsanyi (1977) calls  the “agreement space”.
2.  We need the  part for some degenerate sub-problems. 
3.  The strict convexity of  is weaker than the convexity of S.
C N( ) 1{ } … n{ }, ,{ }= x y‡ x y> x y» xi yi‡
i x y‡ xi yi> i xi yi> i
S b
Sb
Sb u b– R+
N
 u S˛ u b‡,;˛{ }=
Sblog v1log … vnlog, ,( )  v Sb˛;{ }=
Sb 0{ }= v Sb˛ v 0»
Sb 0{ }=
Sb
Sb 0{ }„ Sblog
Sblog
C N( ) S b, ,( )
F C N( ) S b, ,( ) S˛
x S˛ x F C N( ) S b, ,( )>
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Invariance with respect to Affine Transformation (IAT):
 
 
 
If  is an affine transformation
on  (that is, there exist some real numbers , where , such
that  for any ), then one has 
 
,
 
where .
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): If there exists another bargaining problem
 such that  and , then .
The next property, anonymity, uses permutations of players. For any permutation (or one-to-
one function) , let 
 for any ,
 for any partition ,
 for any ,
 for any ,
.
 Anonymity (AN): If  is a permutation of players in N, then
l
RN a 1 … a n b 1 … b n, , , , , b 1 … b n, , 0>
l u( ) a 1 b 1u1+ … a n b nun+, ,( )= u RN˛
F C N( ) l S( ) l b( ), ,( ) l F C N( ) S b, ,( )( )=
l S( ) l u( ) Rn  u S˛;˛{ }=
C N( ) S˜ b, ,( ) S˜ SÌ F C N( ) S b, ,( ) S˜˛ F C N( ) S˜ b, ,( ) F C N( ) S b, ,( )=
f :N Nfi
f D( ) f i( ) N  i D˛;˛{ }= D NÌ
f C N( )( ) f C1( ) … f Cm( ), ,( )= C N( ) C1 … Cm, ,{ }=
f u( ) u
f i( )( )i N˛= u R
N
˛
f T( ) f u( ) RN  u T˛;˛{ }= T RNÌ
f C N( ) S b, ,( ) f C N( )( ) f S( ) f b( ), ,( )=
f
6.
For the usual bargaining problem , which constitutes a special case of the above
model where , it is well known that there exists a unique solution that
satisfies the above four properties, called the Nash solution, and that it solves the maximization
problem
.
We will generalize this result to our model. 
Since the above four properties are not sufficient to produce a unique solution for the general
bargaining problem with a coalition structure, we will now introduce an additional property. For
any two players , let  denote a permutation such that , , and
 for any . 
 DEFINITION 1.   A coalition  is homogeneous in bargaining problem  if
the bargaining problem is symmetric within the coalition, i.e., for any , one has
 and .
F f C N( ) S b, ,( )( ) f F C N( ) S b, ,( )( )=
N S b, ,( )
C N( ) 1{ } … n{ }, ,{ }=
Maxu S u b‡,˛ ui bi–( )
i N˛
Õ
i l, N˛ f i l, :N Nfi f i( ) l= f l( ) i=
f k( ) k= k i l,„
C j C N( ) S b, ,( )
i l, C j˛
f
i l, S( ) S= bi bl=
7Suppose that coalition  is homogeneous in bargaining problem . We will con-
struct a reduced bargaining problem where coalition  is replaced by a new coalition
 that consists of a single representative player . By symmetry, it does not
matter which player in  becomes the representative player . Let  and
let  be the partition of  that is obtained from  by replacing  with . Denote
 by . Define the new feasible set by
.
For the case where , , and , Figure 1 illustrates
how one transforms the original feasible set  into the reduced feasible set .
FIG. 1. Reducing feasible set
C j C N( ) S b, ,( )
C j
C j* j*{ }= j* C j˛
C j j* N
j N C j–( ) j*{ }¨=
C N j( ) N j C N( ) C j j*{ }
ui( )i C jˇ R+
N C j–
˛ u C j–
S j ui( )i N j˛ R
N j
  there exists v S such that ˛ v C j– u C j–=  and vi u j*=  for all  i C j˛;˛
î þ
í ý
ì ü
=
N 1 2 3, ,{ }= C N( ) 1{ } 2 3,{ },{ }= j* 2=
S S2
u1
u3
u2
u1
u2
S2
S
a
b
a
b
b
8Also, define the new breakdown point  from  by replacing 
with . Now consider the following property of a solution:
Representation of Homogeneous Coalition (RHC): If a coalition  is homogeneous in
bargaining problem , then  for any 
(where, of course,  denotes the i-th component of ). 
The RHC property says that if one replaces a homogeneous coalition by a representative
member, the solution does not change. In particular, it requires that the coalition be treated as one
player. We will show in the Appendix
 THEOREM 1.   A solution F satisfies PE, IAT, IIA, AN, and RHC if and only if F solves the
maximization problem
,
where cj is the size (or the number of the members) of Cj  for . 
We have thus extended the usual Nash solution to a more general class of bargaining prob-
lems. Note that the solution is a Nash solution within each coalition as well as across coalitions.
b j RN
j
˛ b RN˛ bi( )i C j˛ R
C j
˛
b j* R˛
C j
C N( ) S b, ,( ) Fi C N j( ) S j b j, ,( ) Fi C N( ) S b, ,( )= i N j˛
Fi F
Maxu S u b‡,˛ ui bi–( )1/c j
i C j˛
Õ
Ł ł
æ ö
j 1=
m
Õ
j 1 … m, ,=
9We can actually regard bargaining as being done simultaneously at two levels, between the mem-
bers of a coalition and between coalitions. Imagine a two-stage process. Coalitions first bargain to
determine the feasible set for each coalition. Once the feasible set is determined for each coali-
tion, its members bargain to determine their shares. When coalitions bargain in the first stage, they
anticipate the final payoffs that the members of coalitions will receive in the end. A coalition can
be regarded as an institutional player in the inter-coalition bargaining whose preferences are
obtained by aggregating the preferences of its members using the intra-coalition solution.
For the above intuitive interpretation to be meaningful, both the inter-coalition and intra-coa-
lition bargaining problems must be well defined, that is, satisfy assumptions A1-A3. We will first
describe the inter-coalition bargaining problem. Define the utility of the institutional representa-
tive, denoted j, of coalition  as the geometric average of the net utilities of its members
.
We can construct a bargaining game between these representatives, . Denote
. The feasible set for this inter-coalition bargaining problem can be defined as 
,
and the breakdown point as 0. Let . Then  is a well-
defined bargaining problem satisfying A1-A3. In particular,  is strictly convex as will be
shown in the Appendix. 
C j
U j uC j bC j–( ) ui bi–( )
1/c j
i C j˛
Õ
=
j 1 … m, ,=
M 1 … m, ,{ }=
SM U j uC j bC j–( )( ) j M˛ R
M
 u S˛ u b‡,;˛
î þ
í ý
ì ü
=
C M( ) 1{ } … m{ }, ,{ }= C M( ) SM 0, ,( )
SMlog
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We will now describe intra-coalition bargaining problems. Denote  simply by
 and recall that  is denoted by . For any , define the projection of
the cross-section of the feasible set  on  at  by 
.
Then  is the feasible set for coalition  given the payoffs  of players outside
the coalition. The feasible set can be normalized by the breakdown point and denoted
It is obvious that  satisfies A2 and A3, for  does. Furthermore,  also sat-
isfies A1 if  is our solution. Thus  constitutes a well-defined bargaining
problem at . It will be also shown in the Appendix that 
 THEOREM 2.   Let . Then 
(i) ,
(ii) .
 
ui( )i C j˛ R+
C j
˛
uC j ui( )i C jˇ R+
N C j–
˛ u C j– u S˛
S RNÌ R+
C j u C j– R+
N C j–
˛
SC j u C j–( ) wC j R+
C j
 there exists some  v S such that v C j– u C j–=  and vC j wC j=˛;˛{ }=
SC j u C j–( ) C j u C j–
SC j u C j–( )( )bC j
wC j bC j– R+
C j
 wC j SC j u C j–( )˛ wC j bC j‡,;˛
î þ
í ý
ì ü
.=
SC j u C j–( )bC j
Sb SC j u C j–( )bC j
u C j{ } SC j u C j–( ) bC j,,( )
u F C N( ) S b, ,( )=
u F C N( ) S b, ,( )=
F C M( ) SM 0, ,( ) U j uC j bC j–( )( ) j M˛=
F C j{ } SC j u C j–( ) bC j,,( ) uC j=
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The theorem may be called “the reduction theorem”. It says that (i) the solution of the inter-
coalition bargaining is the same as the vector of “utilities” of the coalitions at our solution, and (ii)
the solution of an intra-coalition bargaining, given the payoffs of outsiders at our solution, is the
same as our solution. Together, (i) and (ii) show that the bargaining problem can be conceptually
decomposed into two levels of bargaining.
Note that (ii) is similar to the reduction property of the Nash solution, often called “consis-
tency” or “stability” in the literature. (See Harsanyi (1959, 1977) and Lensberg (1988) who use
different versions of the reduction property as an axiom to characterize the Nash solution.4) In our
solution, however, reduction is allowed not for any coalition but only for coalitions that belong to
the given coalition structure . 
We emphasize here that even though the RHC property only prescribes how a solution should
treat homogeneous coalitions, the combination of the RHC property with the other four properties
allows our solution to cover heterogeneous coalitions. For the heterogeneous case, our solution
calls for aggregating the preferences of the members of a coalition. 
4.  Aumann and Maschler (1985) use consistency in the context of bankruptcy problems, and Moulin (1985) 
and Young (1987) in the context of cost-allocation problems. See Thomson (1990) for a survey on the use 
of consistency in the literature. 
C N( ) C1 … Cm, ,{ }=
12
3. DISCUSSIONS ON THE SOLUTION
 3.1. Asymmetric Solution à la Kalai
In order to gain some insights into the nature of our solution, let us now compare it with an
“asymmetric Nash solution” that solves the maximization problem
for some ( ). Nash would have rejected a solution of this form on the ground
that symmetry is required of a solution if players are rational, as the following paragraph from
Nash (1953), quoted verbatim, shows: 
‘The symmetry axiom, Axiom IV, says that the only significant (in determining the value
of the game) differences between the players are those which are included in the mathe-
matical description of the game, which includes their different sets of strategies and util-
ity functions. One may think of Axiom IV as requiring the players to be intelligent and
rational beings. But we think it is a mistake to regard this as expressing “equal bargain-
ing ability” of the players, in spite of a statement to this effect in “The Bargaining Prob-
lem” [2]. With people who are sufficiently intelligent and rational there should not be any
question of “bargaining ability,” a term which suggests something like skill in duping the
other fellow. The usual haggling process is based on imperfect information, the hagglers
trying to propagandize each other into misconceptions of the utilities involved. Our
assumption of complete information makes such an attempt meaningless.’
Observe that there is nothing asymmetric in our solution. The solution actually satisfies ano-
nymity, which captures Nash’s idea of symmetry, but allows for coalitions to play a role. The dif-
ference between our solution and Nash’s solution only reflects the coalition structure that has been
included as an additional element in the mathematical description of the game. 
Maxu S u b‡,˛ ui bi–( )
a i
i N˛
Õ
a i 0> i 1 … n, ,=
13
Kalai (1977), however, makes an interesting observation on asymmetric Nash solution that
could provide some intuition for our solution. He remarks that an asymmetric Nash solution to a
bargaining problem is equivalent to a (symmetric) Nash solution to a replicated bargaining prob-
lem. Replication is the inverse of the reduction process we used in order to reduce a homogeneous
coalition to a single representative player in defining the RHC property. We will now compare the
asymmetric Nash solution à la Kalai to our solution. 
For simplicity, consider two bargaining problems,  and
, where  and . The three-
person bargaining problem is obtained from the two-person bargaining problem by replicating
player 2 into a homogeneous coalition {2,3}. Putting it in another way, the two-person problem is
obtained from the three-person problem by reducing the homogeneous coalition {2, 3} to a single
representative player, that is, player 2. Intuitively, players 2 and 3 are “twin brothers” who support
each other. 
In characterizing a two-person asymmetric Nash solution, Kalai remarks that  is a solu-
tion to 
if and only if  is a solution to 
.
On the other hand, in characterizing our three-person solution, we remark that  is a solu-
tion to 
1{ } 2{ },{ } S 0 0,( ), ,( )
1{ } 2 3,{ },{ } S˜ 0 0 0, ,( ), ,( ) S R2Ì S˜ x y y, ,( ) R3  x y,( ) S˛;˛{ }=
x y,( )
Max u1 u2,( ) S˛  u1 u2( )
2
×  
x y y, ,( )
Max
u1 u2 u3, ,( ) S˜˛  u1 u2 u3× ×  
x y y, ,( )
14
if and only if  is a solution to
.
Suppose  so that . Then the
asymmetric Nash solution to the two-person problem and the (symmetric) Nash solution to the
three-person problem are  and , respectively, while our solutions to
these problems are  and , respectively. The crucial difference is that
in Kalai’s framework, twin brothers maintain their separate rights to talk, while in our framework,
they really become one bargainer.
 3.2. Joint-Bargaining Paradox
One interesting implication of our bargaining solution is that it may be unprofitable to form a
coalition in pure bargaining problems as can be seen easily from the following example: 
 EXAMPLE 1.   Consider a pure-bargaining situation where , 
, and  with two alternative coalition structures on N: 
 and . One has 
,
.
Max
u1 u2 u3, ,( ) S˜˛  u1 u2( )
1 2⁄
u3( )1 2⁄× ×  
x y,( )
Max u1 u2,( ) S˛  u1 u2×  
S x y,( ) R+2  x y+ 1£;˛{ }= S˜ x y y, ,( ) R+3  x y+ 1£;˛{ }=
1 3⁄ 2 3⁄,( ) 1 3⁄ 2 3⁄ 2 3⁄, ,( )
1 2⁄ 1 2⁄,( ) 1 2⁄ 1 2⁄ 1 2⁄, ,( )
N 1 2 3, ,{ }=
S x y z, ,( ) R+3  x y z+ + 1£;˛{ }= b 0=
C N( ) 1{ } 2{ } 3{ }, ,{ }= C * N( ) 1 2,{ } 3{ },{ }=
F C N( ) S b, ,( ) 13--
1
3--
1
3--, ,Ł ł
æ ö
=
F C * N( ) S b, ,( ) 14--
1
4--
1
2--, ,Ł ł
æ ö
=
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In this example, if all three players bargain independently, they split the joint payoff equally
so that each player obtains 1/3. But if players 1 and 2 act as one player, the game becomes a two-
person game between the coalition {1, 2} and player 3 so that each bargaining party obtains 1/2.
Within the coalition, players 1 and 2 further split the joint payoff 1/2. Regarding (essentially) this
example, Harsanyi (1977) says
‘Clearly we will obtain a similar result in all n-person simple bargaining games if two or
more players decide to act as one player (except in the trivial case in which all n players
participate in this agreement). We call this the joint-bargaining paradox. This paradox is
not attributable to some peculiarity of our solution concept, because any possible solu-
tion concept will show this behavior if it satisfies the symmetry and the joint-efficiency
postulates (which are obviously necessary ingredients of any acceptable solution for sim-
ple bargaining games).’ 
Harsanyi gives two alternative interpretations for the paradox presuming that actual bargain-
ing is carried out by a representative on behalf of a coalition: (i) the representative of a coalition
may be more cautious because she has to represent others; (ii) the representative’s incentive is
affected because she has to hand over part of any gain to other members. Our interpretation for the
paradox is that forming a larger coalition reduces multiple “rights to talk” to a single right and
thereby benefits the outsiders. (See, for example, Horn and Wolinsky (1988) for a similar interpre-
tation.) In pure bargaining situations, where all bargainers have to agree to reach a settlement,
fewer rights to talk means reduced bargaining power. 
One might ask if joining a larger coalition makes all participants worse off under our solu-
tion. The answer is no as the following example shows:
16
 EXAMPLE 2.   Consider a pure-bargaining situation where , 
, and  with two alternative coalition structures 
on N:  and . One has 
,
.
In this example, if player 1 joins the coalition {2, 3, 4}, then the coalition {2, 3, 4} benefits
from the merger. Player 1, however, gets worse off. In general, there is always someone who will
get worse off and thus has no incentive to join the coalition as the next theorem shows. Thus a
coalition will not form voluntarily in a pure-bargaining situation. We will show in the Appendix
 THEOREM 3.   Consider a pair of bargaining problems , ,
where the partition  has at least three coalitions and  is obtained from
 by merging coalitions  and  into . Suppose
. Then there exists some player , for whom
.
N 1 … 5, ,{ }=
S x1 … x5, ,( ) R+5  x1 … x5+ + 1£;˛{ }= b 0=
C N( ) 1{ } 2 3 4, ,{ } 5{ }, ,{ }= C * N( ) 1 2 3 4, , ,{ } 5{ },{ }=
F C N( ) S b, ,( ) 13--
1
9--
1
9--
1
9--
1
3--, , , ,Ł ł
æ ö
=
F C * N( ) S b, ,( ) 18--
1
8--
1
8--
1
8--
1
2--, , , ,Ł ł
æ ö
=
C N( ) S b, ,( ) C * N( ) S b, ,( )
C N( ) C * N( ) S b, ,( )
C N( ) S b, ,( ) C1 C2 C1 2,
F C N( ) S b, ,( ) F C * N( ) S b, ,( )„ i C1 2,˛
Fi C N( ) S b, ,( ) Fi C * N( ) S b, ,( )>
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That acting as one unit is not necessarily profitable is also well known in a non-bargaining
context. In a market context, for example, Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) observe that a
merger in a Cournot model can decrease the profits of the merging firms while increasing the prof-
its of the outsiders.5 This “merger paradox” occurs because acting as one unit decreases merging
firms’ market share. 
In some other market models, such as the Bertrand model of Deneckere and Davidson
(1985), forming a coalition is profitable. In a market context, not only the division but also the
size of the pie (that is, industry profits) changes due to a merger. Thus if the increase in overall
industry profits is sufficiently large, a merger can be profitable. In our pure-bargaining problem,
however, the size of the pie is not affected by coalition formation, and thus forming a coalition is
always unprofitable. 
According to Theorem 3, forming a coalition is not profitable in pure-bargaining situations.
Why would a coalition form then? One answer may be that many real-life bargaining situations
are not pure-bargaining situations. In a non-pure bargaining situation, it can be profitable to form
a coalition. The reason is that forming a coalition can improve the fall-back positions of the coali-
tion members. 
 EXAMPLE 3.   Consider a pure-bargaining situation where ,   
, and . Now, suppose that if players 1 and 2 
form a coalition, they can select, without involving player 3, a point in 
5.  See also Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
N 1 2 3, ,{ }=
S x y z, ,( ) R+3  x y z+ + 1£;˛{ }= b 0 0 0, ,( )=
18
, where . The solution to this bargaining problem 
between 1 and 2 is , which can be taken as the fall-
back positions of the members of the coalition in the overall bargaining problem. Now consider 
two alternative coalition structures on N:  and 
. One has
,
.
Thus, if , one has 
 for . 
In this example, it is profitable for players 1 and 2 to form a coalition if . When play-
ers 1 and 2 decide whether or not to form a coalition, they face a trade-off. On the one hand, as in
the pure-bargaining case, forming a coalition reduces the rights to talk of the two players to a sin-
gle right. On the other hand, the incremental pie over which the coalition bargains with the out-
sider (player 3) is reduced because the coalition members can secure part of the benefit of
cooperation without the outsider’s participation. This tends to put the coalition’s members in a
stronger bargaining position.
S 1 2,{ } x y,( ) R+2  x y+ r£;˛{ }= r 0 1,[ ]˛
F 1{ } 2{ },{ } S 1 2,{ } 0 0,( ), ,( ) r 2⁄ r 2⁄,( )=
C N( ) 1{ } 2{ } 3{ }, ,{ }=
C * N( ) 1 2,{ } 3{ },{ }=
F C N( ) S 0 0 0, ,( ), ,( ) 13--
1
3--
1
3--, ,Ł ł
æ ö
=
F C * N( ) S r 2⁄ r 2⁄ 0, ,( ), ,( ) r2--
1 r–
4----------+
r
2--
1 r–
4----------+
1 r–
2----------, ,Ł ł
æ ö
=
r 1 3⁄>
Fi C N( ) S 0 0 0, ,( ), ,( ) Fi C * N( ) S r 2⁄ r 2⁄ 0, ,( ), ,( )< i 1 2,{ }˛
r 1/3>
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we introduced an axiomatic solution to pure bargaining problems with exoge-
nous coalitions. The crucial axiom was representation of homogeneous coalition, which states
that a homogeneous coalition can be replaced by one of its members without changing the solu-
tion. The combination of this axiom, which most papers in the literature where coalitions are bar-
gainers have been implicitly using, with other standard axioms led to a solution that allowed us to
interpret a (possibly heterogeneous) coalition as an institutional player whose preferences are
obtained by aggregating the preferences of its members. 
We compared our solution with Kalai’s asymmetric Nash solution. We also examined Harsa-
nyi’s joint-bargaining paradox under our solution. Specifically, we showed that forming a coali-
tion is unprofitable in pure-bargaining situations but that it can be profitable in non-pure
bargaining situations. 
Our solution is an ideal solution where the coalition’s preferences fully reflect the members’
preferences. This points to both the strength and weakness of the solution. In the real world, form-
ing a negotiating entity, perhaps supported by appropriate contractual arrangements, that can
negotiate faithfully on behalf of all of its members is a tall order. On the other hand, an institution
that does not reflect the preferences of its constituency to some extent would not be politically via-
ble. 
From the modeling point of view, our solution can be used as a benchmark with which other
solutions can be compared. In our solution, the members of a coalition act as one player consoli-
dating their individual “rights to talk” into a single right to talk. In future research, one may think
20
about some intermediate solutions where the members’ rights to talk are reduced but not necessar-
ily into a single right. For instance, a simple majority of the members may be able to veto a deal.6 
6. In a recent working paper, Manzini and Mariotti (2001) analyze the effect of various collective decision 
mechanisms on bargaining behavior in an alternating-offer game between a player and an “alliance”. 
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 APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Theorem 1. Denote the solution to the maximization problem by .
It is obvious that this solution satisfies PE, IAT, AN, IIA, and RHC. Thus we only need show that
if a solution F satisfies PE, IAT, AN, IIA, and RHC, then . We do this in two steps. First,
we show that  holds for a class of bargaining problems using PE, AN, and RHC. Then we
generalize this to any bargaining problem using IAT and IIA.
Consider a class of bargaining problems that are not only symmetric within any coalition but
also such that the reduced bargaining problem where each coalition is replaced by a representative
player is also symmetric. Then by PE and AN, the solution to the reduced bargaining problem pre-
scribed by F is the symmetric solution. By RHC, the solution to the original problem prescribed
by F is also the symmetric solution. Since the symmetric solution is the only solution that satisfies
PE, AN, and RHC and  also satisfies these axioms,  and  prescribe the same solution for
the class of bargaining problems we are considering. Consider a subclass of such bargaining prob-
lems where  and the symmetric solution is . These bargaining problems will
be called simple bargaining problems. 
Now consider any bargaining problem  such that . Then by A1,
. Let  be an affine transformation such that  and
.
7
 Note that . It is easy to see that  contains
 and that  is compact. Since  is strictly convex,
7.  Note that  is well defined since .
FN C N( ) S b, ,( )
F FN=
F FN=
FN F FN
b 0= e 1 … 1, ,( )=
C N( ) S b, ,( ) Sb 0{ }„
FN C N( ) S b, ,( ) b» l l b( ) 0=
l FN C N( ) S b, ,( )( ) e= l S( )
l b( ) l Sb( )= l Sb( )
l FN C N( ) S b, ,( ) b»
e 0» l Sb( ) Sblog y1log … ynlog, ,( )  y Sb˛;{ }=
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the set  is also strictly convex. (An affine
transformation of  amounts to adding a constant vector to .) Thus  satisfies A1-A3.
Therefore,  is a well-defined bargaining problem. 
 Since  and  is strictly convex,
there exists some simple bargaining problem  such that . By IIA,
. Thus, by IAT, . 
If , then . It is easy to see that the axioms also imply
. z
Proof of the Strict Convexity of . Let . Then 
 and 
for some . Let . Then
for some  by the convexity of . Thus 
.
That is,  is convex. 
l Sb( )( )log y1log … ynlog, ,( ) RN˛  y l Sb( )˛;{ }”
Sb Sblog l Sb( )
C N( ) l S( ) 0, ,( )
e l FN C N( ) S b, ,( )( ) FN C N( ) l S( ) 0, ,( )= = l Sb( )( )log
C N( ) T 0, ,( ) l S( ) TÌ
F C N( ) l S( ) 0, ,( ) F C N( ) T 0, ,( ) e= = F C N( ) S b, ,( ) FN C N( ) S b, ,( )=
Sb 0{ }= F
N C N( ) S b, ,( ) b=
F C N( ) S b, ,( ) b=
SMlog V W, SMlog˛
V vi
1/c j
i C j˛
Õ
log
Ł ł
æ ö
j M˛
= W wi
1/c j
i C j˛
Õ
log
Ł ł
æ ö
j M˛
=
v w, Sb˛ a 0 1,( )˛
a V 1 a–( )W+ 1
c j
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a vi 1 a–( ) wilog+log{ }
i C j˛
å
Ł ł
æ ö
j M˛
1
c j
---- zilog
i C j˛
å
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SMlog˛=
SMlog
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 In order to show that  is strictly convex, one needs to show that all boundary points of
 are extreme points. Suppose to the contrary that there exist points  such
that  is a boundary point. There exist  such that 
 and .
One has 
.
Since  is strictly convex, the vector  is an interior point of
. Since the function  from  to  maps open sets onto
open sets,  is an interior point of . This leads to a contradiction. z
Proof of Theorem 2. By Theorem 1,  is the solution to the maximization
problem
.
In other words, 
,
SMlog
SMlog V W, SMlog˛
1
2--V
1
2--W+ v w, Sb˛
V vi
1/c j
i C j˛
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log
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æ ö
j M˛
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1/c j
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where  is the solution to the maximization problem
that is, . This proves (i).
We will now show that (ii) holds. Let  and
. Then  is the solution to 
,
and  is the solution to 
,
which is equivalent to 
.
 Therefore, . z
u S˛
Maxu S u b‡,˛ U j uC j bC j–( )j M˛Õ
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Proof of Theorem 3. For brevity, let  and let
. Since , it follows from the definition
of our solution that
and that 
Subtracting the second equation from the first and rewriting yields (using )
and hence either  or , which implies that there exists some
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